

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

WHY PARIS?

Dear Sir,
I have known many things about Africa which I did not know before. This is a big lesson, I should say, for many of the Readers of "Africa".

I am one of the Readers of your esteemed monthly magazine since its birth, except some which I missed at the start.

What I had in mind was why its office became situated outside of the continent. Can't it be in one of the cities of Africa? It is good to see such kind of publication by Africans for Africans and mostly about Africa. It would have been good also if it is where its name signified.

G.H. Assefa
Addis Ababa

Dear Sir,

Much as one would hail the dynamism behind the magazine, AFRICA and her astounding progress within her short span of life till date, one wonders why Paris, of all capitals, should be the choice of her proprietors as the Head-Office.

A hind-sight reflection on refugee African political leaders seeking asylum in Europe leaves one in the cold realisation of whether Africa can accommodate her patriot sons and daughters no matter the trends of the vicissitudes of their political career. On the other hand AFRICA is relatively young and with no partisan past to fear as such.

It's a truism that the freedom of the press is constantly in hot debate in contemporary Africa, and more so as Africans continue in the ascendancy and their domination of the African political scene.

It's equally true that most of Africa's pressure groups were pioneered in Europe or America for the mere reason that the pioneering fathers had their education and subsequent social awareness kindled far away from home. But in contemporary Africa

and in the language of King Arthur could it be said again of our continent—great Africa.

"Breathes there a soul so dead
That could not say this is
[my own]
This is my native land."

African Universities are, in our days, known to be awarding their own degrees and the University of Lagos and the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, offer courses in either Mass Communication or Journalism.

Other African Universities are inclined to look to Nigeria for avenues of co-operation in fields such as this.

In view of this, and in view of the vested interest of extraneous powers whom we have known to thwart African chances for peace and concord, and eventual greatness, safely tied to their apron strings, the propriety of the choice of Paris lends itself to questions. The Guinea experience outside the French Community is of pertinent reference here and now.

What have we in Africa, that precludes our march to greatness or what recommends Paris in our scale of preferences as to take priority over any spot on African soil? This borders on ethnocentrism but patriotism demands this extension of ethnocentrism. It is revolting that the better mind of Africa is in tenancy in France! What's up in Paris "AFRICA"?

Bola Oreblyi
Yaba - Lagos

Dear Reader,

Your letter is most welcome. It is easy to perceive your patriotic feelings towards Africa. You have touched on a question that a number of readers have raised within the last few months in one form or the other.

The choice of Paris, as the head office of AFRICA, was dictated by simple administrative and technical conditions. As you are perhaps

not aware, AFRICA Magazine is published as a sister paper of JEUNE AFRIQUE which has established a sound administrative machinery over that period. JEUNE AFRIQUE is owned entirely by French speaking Africans and its resources, financial and administrative, formed the launching pad of AFRICA Magazine. AFRICA is being published from Paris because it is cheaper to do so. There is no other reason behind the choice of Paris. The two Magazines, even if one is in English and the other in French, cover the same subject—the African continent. The staff of both papers work in the same building and share common facilities thus cutting down costs.

You should feel assured that our temporary location in Europe diminishes nothing from our awareness of the problems of the African continent. It is our hope to be able in due time, when our resources permit, to move our base physically to Africa.

Editor

Dear Sir,

It is rather difficult to recollect with any exactitude when the first ripples of indigenous protests and offensive surfaced on the African continent against the continuing desire and attempt by the "white man" to effectively and indefinitely mastermind the affairs of the African, and to further stultify all his attempts to establish once and for all a strong, lasting and respectable personality and image for himself.

This crusade has for sometime been the nightmarish preoccupation of the Black African Press, but how much of this crusade has been interpreted practically outside the confines of mere journalistic outbursts and academic rhetoric is another question. To the much vilified "Imperialists and neocolonialists" African dissension as it is today, except in certain dynamic countries, is mere ridi-

culous, laughable and empty verbiage.

Professor S.A. Aluko's "The Follower Continent" published in AFRICA No 10 is just one of the long series of scholarly write-ups on this same topic of the need for a more meaningful African contribution to world technology. It is very disheartening and depressing however, that in a couple of influential African countries the same academicians "campus theoreticians" and leaders who are so vocal on such issues become unashamedly petty and silent when sectional loyalties are allowed to cancerate national and continental interests and goals.

In the fields of Sports and Scientific Research very significant initiatives can, and have been most autocratically suppressed for the simple reasons that such initiatives did not germinate in certain "privileged" areas of a particular country. A case in point is the first ever known attempt by a Nigerian professor to produce anti-cholera vaccines. A government-backed success in this venture could have been a tremendous publicity and foreign exchange earner. But as long as that break-through came from an "obscure", recently war-torn University, it was not worth thinking about. Whatmore, most Nigerians watched dumb founded, and some collaboratively as a "neo-colonialist", non-expert medical personnel from the W.H.O. flew into Lagos, and had the final say on the issue. I personally feel that this kind of sabotage engenders pessimism among some of us who would wish to feel that Africa still has a chance of fair competition on world matters.

Rather than go about making political noise and wielding local economic might in the continent, most African governments should encourage their people to sit down and do some home work on how to relegate sectional interests to the background and

Letters to the Editor should contain the full name and address of the writer, and must be signed. Because of space, short letters have a better chance of publication.

Letters to the Editor should be addressed to:
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PARIS (17^e) France



General Amin

" CIVIS BRITANNICUS SUM "

by Raph Uwechue

"The blow aimed at Britain must not be allowed to rebound on the solidarity of the Third World or disturb the cordial relationship between Africans and Asians in general."

The future of East African Asians, a smouldering fire since the independence of the three East African countries a decade ago, has been suddenly rekindled by General Amin's ultimatum that Ugandan Asians with British passports should quit his country by next November. This order gives tens of thousands of people of all ages barely 90 days to uproot themselves from Ugandan soil where the British planted them over 70 years ago.

There is no doubt that the thriving Asian community of Uganda dominates an important sector of the country's commercial life and after three generations, appears unable or unwilling to integrate with the African population. There may be strong social and religious reasons behind their non integration policy but the ordinary Ugandans can hardly be blamed if they view the community's segregationist existence in their midst with suspicion, if not hostility. Their situation cannot but give them the image of parasites in Uganda's blood stream.

At independence ten years ago, the Asians had a handsome opportunity to show their faith in the country where most of them were born. Those of them who opted for Ugandan citizenship acted wisely. If this category of Asians becomes affected by the expulsion order, the Ugandan government would have shown proof of racism; in which case it would be out place to expect African approval of such action. But those who chose to remain aloof as British citizens, thus trusting the British more than their African compatriots have only themselves to blame.

Their fault is shared by Britain who offered them counterfeit British citizenship at a decisive moment in their lives. But for the British seduction at the approach of independence, the Asians would have had a simple choice before them—becoming Ugandan citizens and so expecting to share in the fortunes, good or bad, of the young nation or quitting the country quietly with minimum bitterness along with their British protectors. Having inveigled them into their present predicament, the onus lies unequivocally on the British government to honour its pledge. Surely, Asians are not *citizens* only when Britain needs them as colonial ploys and *foreigners* when they need Britain for their survival.

A century ago, Britain's impetuous Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, justified British military intervention in Greece, on behalf of a British citizen of Maltese origin, with his defence of *Civis Romanus sum*. With that proud stance, borrowed from the tradition of Imperial Rome, he asserted, and Parliament consented, that a British citizen, wherever he may be, no matter his origin, was the undisputed

responsibility of Her Majesty's government.' Mr. Heath's attempt, unsuccessful so far, to haggle over the manner and measure of admitting British citizens into Britain smells of a machiavellian reversal of a time-honoured policy. It is to be hoped that Britain has now accepted her burden with grace and for good.

British responsibility apart, the questions for Uganda and Africa which General Amin and his advisers must consider carefully are the overall racial implications of the present drive against Asians. Whatever the merits of the argument against them—commercial exploitation, aloofness from the African population—the essential point to bear in mind is that these Asians are, in the final analysis, hapless victims of an unscrupulous imperial policy. Today, Asians and Africans form part of the Third World, whose peoples are still struggling to recover from colonial exploitation and de-humanizing racial oppression. They have every need to stand together, not apart. In his bid to "teach Britain a lesson", General Amin needs to display as much diplomacy and humanity as he has so far shown firmness. The blow aimed at Britain must not be allowed to rebound on the solidarity of the Third World or disturb the cordial relationship between Africans and Asians in general.

There is also the purely human aspect to consider. Whatever may be their guilt in Ugandan eyes today, these Asians did play some role in the development of the country up until now. No one has seriously accused them of political interference in Uganda. Thus they can hardly be regarded as constituting any direct or immediate threat to the government. In the circumstances, it seems as brutal as it is undiplomatic to precipitate an inter-racial crisis over the question of their departure from Uganda. General Amin has put his country's *legal* case very articulately. Few people who respect Ugandan sovereignty and feelings would disagree with the very legitimate aspirations of the government to order Ugandan economy in the interest of the majority of the country's citizens. But the issue presently at stake has wider implications; hence the need for circumspection.

In handling what is clearly a delicate problem, General Amin can borrow a leaf from the governments of Kenya and Tanzania. They too have a similar problem but have managed to approach it differently. A dramatic display of pique against Britain over the Asian question may bring some political rewards to Amin's regime within Uganda, but its possible inter-racial consequences in the Third World counsel a more studied approach.



Signing the Benghazi Agreement

AFRICAN AFFAIRS

EGYPT-LIBYA: TOTAL UNION

by Gabriel Bustros

"It would be difficult to imagine two countries more adaptable to economic integration than Libya and Egypt. But can a highly centralised state with century old institutions be smoothly dovetailed with a mainly nomadic country whose administrative machinery is still running in?"

On August 2 Col. Gaddafi of Libya and President Sadat of Egypt announced from Benghazi that they had agreed to abolish their desert frontier and merge into a new united Arab Republic. The announcement came after three days of high-powered discussions between the two leaders assisted by members of their governments and by experts in such diverse fields as international law, defence and national security, education, science, information and culture.

In the words of the Arabic-language newspaper Al Ahram of Cairo, admittedly the mouthpiece of the Egyptian government, "the talks between President Sadat and Col. Gaddafi covered all the problems stemming from total union and the practical means of bringing such union into being in both Egypt and Libya, according to a clear-cut time-table". Cairo Radio revealed later in the day that there would be a "unified political command"—vested with supreme authority and comprising the present leaders of the two countries—which would hold its first meeting in

Tripoli on September 3 1973.

In the meantime six mixed committees will be set up to scrutinize the proposed union project, work out detailed plans of execution, and later report to Col. Gaddafi and President Sadat before the final form of the new state is approved by the appropriate constitutional bodies and then by referenda in both countries.

Islam is to be the religion of the new State and Cairo its capital. Its flag will be that of the tripartite Federation of Arab Republics of Egypt, Libya and Syria formed last year—a fact which is probably intended to show that the new State shall not alter the existing relationships in Arab affairs.

Viewed from its purely economic implications this "historic turning-point" is none too soon for Egypt. Out of total exports of 339 million pounds in 1970-71, some 190 million pounds worth of consumer and other goods were accounted for by the Soviet Union and other eastern-bloc countries. Now that relations between Cairo and Moscow are strained,

to say the least, Egypt will be faced with a major marketing problem unless new outlets of commensurate magnitude can be developed elsewhere. This will not be an easy task for Egyptian planners in the context of today's international trade, characterized by the existence of discriminating groups of trade partners, i.e. the European Common Market (EEC), Comecon—its eastern-bloc counterpart and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—all of which are difficult to penetrate by outsiders. Under late President Nasser, Egypt had gained a toe-hold in a number of African markets to which she exported a few durable goods, notably refrigerators and metal furniture, but in view of the weak purchasing power of the average African the volume of exports soon reached saturation point and has remained strictly limited ever since.

Luckily for Egypt, the second five-year economic and social development Plan (1969-1974) currently under way in Libya involves the expenditure of £1,150 million. The Plan which was



Libya's army: marching orders for Palestine?

initiated under the monarchy largely depended for its execution on Italian contractors and semi-skilled labour, but since the overthrow of King Idriss on September 1 1969 an increasing number of major projects have been put in the hands of Egyptian contractors, led by The Arab Contractors Co. (Osman Ahmed Osman), notably in the sectors of public works, road-building, housing, land reclamation and rural development, light industry and education. Total appropriations allocated to these projects under the Plan stand at £823 million. With the expected unimpeded flow of goods, capital and manpower between Egypt and Libya when the new State becomes a reality on September 1 1973 Egypt will naturally have a big finger in the Libyan development pie. The provision of the Foreign Capital Investment Law of January 1958 requiring that 90% of the total staff of any given enterprise in Libya must be Libyan nationals will no longer operate against Egypt and this will give President Sadat and his government the key to the ever recurrent problem of the growing number of unemployed and under-employed Egyptian manpower.

It would be difficult to imagine two countries more adaptable to economic integration than Libya and Egypt. With her population of 36 million living off 2.5% of the national territory of about

one million square kilometres—the rest being waterless desert—Egypt may be said to be overpopulated. By contrast, Libya is underpopulated having only 2 million inhabitants scattered on roughly 1.8 million kilometres. Like Egypt most of the Libyan territory is desert land but its subsoil is fabulously rich since in less than 10 years Libya has joined the club of the major crude oil producers in the Middle East, with aggregate crude

THE LIBYAN FIVE-YEAR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (1969-1974)	
Public Works	177.4
Communications	162.5
Agriculture	150.0
Housing	128.5
Public Administration	123.6
Education	116.3
Industry	90.6
Reserves for projects	58.0
Health	56.0
Information and Culture	29.8
Labour and Social Affairs	22.5
Tourism	14.8
Youth and Sport	11.3
Planning and Development	6.7
National Economy	1.5
TOTAL 1,149.5	

Source. — Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin, March/April 1969.

exports of 160 million tons in 1970 representing 99% of total exports.

Libya's oil revenue in dollars provides a gross national product (GNP) of 2.9 billion which divided per capita insures an individual income of 1,460 dollars per annum to the average Libyan as against 188 dollars for the Egyptian derived from a GNP of 6 billion.

Because of its oil wealth Libya's foreign exchange holdings now amount to 3.2 billion dollars compared with Egypt's 164 million, and in 1970 Libya's trade balance—the difference between export earnings and spending for imports—showed a surplus of 1,734 million dollars compared with an Egyptian deficit of 374 million in the same year.

When the new State comes into being after September 1973, its consolidated balance of payments will then show a comfortable surplus of 1,360 million dollars, thereby enabling Egypt to pay up its accumulated foreign debts.

Today, Libya faces the paradoxical problem of being physically unable to cope with her growing wealth. In other words, her vast foreign exchange holdings are far in excess of what her other native factors of production (i.e. manpower and entrepreneurship) can use for the welfare of the community, and the government finds itself compelled to invest abroad—in London and Switzerland—its surplus capital. Obviously,

THE VEXED QUESTION

Libya has already received 40 Mirage fighter-bombers, or about one-third of the total order, as well as a number of French helicopters, of which nine are heavy Super-Frelon transport units with a range of 300 kilometres.

One of the standard clauses of the sales contract stipulates that no military material may be ceded by the purchaser to a third country without the prior approval of the suppliers, failing which the contract would be terminated.


In the case of Libya, the setting up of a unified military command—whereby Libyan troops would be placed under the direct and unqualified control of Egyptian generals—and more particularly the formation of a joint air force would doubtless be interpreted as tantamount to cession by Libya to a third country of military material of French design.

In an article published on August 6, Hassanein Heikal, Editor of the Arabic-language newspaper Al-Ahram of Cairo assured his readers that the balance of the Mirage order would be received in accordance with the delivery schedule set in the contract which comes to expiry in 1974.

Asked about the Mirage deal two days earlier, M. Jean-Philippe Lecat, a Senior French government official said in Paris that the embargo on arms deliveries to any "combat zone" still stands and he added: "...but we shall have to watch the situation very closely".

DOUBLE-CURRENT TRADE

The complementary character of the Libyan and Egyptian economies can be illustrated by the composition of Libya's exports, excluding oil crudes, at least six would fall well within the pattern of Egypt's imports. These include livestock on the hoof and products, scrap metal, unprocessed tobacco leaf, fresh and frozen fish, oil cake and olive sediment, and almonds. In exchange, Egypt can provide Libya with a wide assortment of consumer goods, including textiles and ready-made clothes, footwear, pharmaceuticals and drugs, and a few items of durable goods: refrigerators, metal furniture, TV and radio sets, utility cars, motor coaches and buses. A consignment of 350 buses, worth about £10 million were shipped to Libya in recent weeks. More sophisticated goods, notably, machine tools, electrical motors and equipment, and simple metal parts and products for the building industry, now in short supply even for the Egyptian home markets, could be added to the export list when the new Soviet-built plants of the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex go into production in two years' time.



Libya's Jalloud

such a drain is harmful to the region as a whole which is still appallingly poor by western standards because it is chronically short of development funds. If union between Egypt and Libya is to go the whole economic and financial hog, today's surplus capital can be harnessed to better use.

On the political and military advantages accruing to President Sadat within the framework of the new State, observers of the Middle East scene have expressed conflicting opinions. According to some the repatriation of the Soviet military experts and the dismantling of the ultra-modern equipment which only themselves could man properly have crippled the striking force of General Sadek, the Egyptian war minister, to the point that a frontal assault on the Bar Lev defence line would be nothing short of suicide. Other analysts take a more optimistic view. Since money is the sinews of war, President Sadat should emerge from the Benghazi talks potentially more powerful than ever before. France may well default on her Mirage deliveries to Libya, but then there is Britain and, if not Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany. Last year Vickers Ltd, Millbank, undertook to build three midget submarines for the Israeli navy and the Foreign Office in London conveniently described the contract as a "private deal" with which it

could not interfere. Could Britain deny Egypt the Chieftain tanks she needs, now that a precedent by-passing the arms embargo has been created? Would not Bonn, in the event of a British refusal, seize the opportunity to reassert her economic and military importance to the Arab Middle East by accepting President Sadat's shopping list?

So it does seem that the Egyptian leader has before him possibly more than one arsenal from which to choose and pick the weaponry best suited to the exigencies of his confrontation with Israel, but—this time—far from the interplay of the power politics pursued by the US and the Soviet Union.

Arab world reaction to the Benghazi announcement has been mixed. Syrian President Hafez el Assad on hearing the news from President Sadat and Col. Gaddafi by telephone congratulated himself on the agreement, considering, as he said it to foreign correspondents, that "every decision taken towards a deeper and closer federal merging merely expresses the will of the Syrian people and fulfills the aspirations of the Arab nation". The Syrian press, however, while giving full coverage of the proposed union, refrained from comments.

In Lebanon, the French daily "Le Soir" gave prominence to the one-year transitional period accepted by Col. Gaddafi as a significant compromise reflect-



Egyptians with Soviet-built tanks


ing President Sadat's ability as pacesetter of Arab politics; the Arabic-language daily "As Safa" urged the government to move closer to Syria for fear of political isolation.

Cairo reacted with distinctive calm in tune with the moderate tone of the local press, and there was no marked jubilation in the streets. Open air cafés and restaurants, especially those strung along the river Nile where the evening breeze is delightfully soothing, were, as is usual in August, full to capacity, and the relaxed attitude of their patrons indicated that no problems were on their minds except the oppressive heat of downtown Cairo. Cinemas did not interrupt their daytime performance to flash the Benghazi announcement on the screen, as was the case when the Suez Canal was nationalised in 1956 by late President Nasser. Cairo Radio, too, notorious for its occasional blusterings, did not go out of its way to brace the nation. Only one of its slogans declared: "the heart of the Arab masses is in a flurry now that their two revolutionary leaders are meeting on Libyan soil to devise means for strengthening unity in front of the enemy."

There are no signs so far that this union has gone down well with the "new classes" in Egypt. The Moslem Brotherhood may well rub their hands with hopeful anticipation at the influence



Sadat with Kosygin



Libya's oil: smoothing the way for union

which austere and mystical Col. Gaddafi would exercise over the new State, but the Rightist pro-Nasser factions, including such well-known figures as Zachariah Mohyeddine, Hussein el-Shafel, Sarwat Okasha, Abdel Latif Boghdadi, Kamal Eddine Hussein, etc, at present President Sadat's main supporters, could hardly be expected to trust the Libyan


"Today, Libya faces the paradoxical problem of being physically unable to cope with her growing wealth. In other words, her vast foreign exchange holdings are far in excess of what her other native factors of production (i.e. manpower and entrepreneurship) can use for the welfare of the community, and the government finds itself compelled to invest abroad. If union between Egypt and Libya is to go the whole economic and financial hog, today's surplus capital can be harnessed to better use."

leader. His sabre-rattling and unpredictable militant mood could drag Egypt into ill-planned external adventures at a time when political stability and peace with justice ought to be the order of the day. Hostility to the union by the left—the Marxist as well as Liberal factions—is already predicated by the anti-Soviet and anti-communist orientation of the Tripoli government.

In Libya, sentiment is running high.

Despite the "outburst of popular rejoicings" engineered by the civic authorities in Benghazi, Tripoli, Misurata and other towns, the government will be hard put to subdue the jingoism of the native population or its unveiled resentment at the increasing number of Egyptians holding key posts in the army, the police, or employed by the civil administration as school teachers or skilled labour. One common fear expressed in Libya today is that the "brothers" coming from the East may some day step into the shoes of the old Italian colonialists.

By their common language and religion, Libya and Egypt may be one, yet they stand miles apart due to their historical background, their customs and manners, their mentality, their political evolution, the degree of their economic development, their institutions. Will it be possible to bridge the gap between them and, in a single year, work out and set into operation one single constitution, common political institutions, one system of State finances, one judicial machinery, an integrated economic structure, to say nothing of the reshuffling needed in education and other State services? Can a smoothly highly centralised State with century-old institutions be dovetailed to a predominantly nomadic country with an administrative machinery still "running-in"? These are questions that stand between idealism and reality. ■



Victims of state thuggery

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC BOKASSA'S THIEVES

by Peter Enahoro

"President Bokassa cannot pretend that beating convicted thieves to death is a satisfactory alternative policy to finding the answers which will transform the economy of his people, create jobs and remove one of the causes of social ills."

The incident recently when President Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic led a detachment of soldiers into a Bangui jail to beat up convicted thieves would not have come to those who have followed the President's career as any great surprise. Since he seized power from his own cousin, David Dacko, on New Year's Eve in 1965, the former colonel and chief of staff of the National Defence, has gained international attention more for his bizarre activities, teary emotionalism and public tantrums, than for any great innovations he may have introduced in his country.

When General de Gaulle died, General Bokassa was overcome with emotion at the graveside of the man he described as his "political father". He had to be helped away from the scene at which he wept hysterically. Last year, he sent diplomatic couriers scouring the back streets of South Vietnam in search of a daughter born to him while he served with the French forces in Indochina. It was in character with the saga of Jean-

Bedel Bokassa that the first teenage girl presented to him as his daughter (and whom he gave a royal welcome, causing foreign envoys to assemble in the small hours of the morning) was a fake.

Sentimental though he may be, Bokassa is not over-squeamish about violence. In April 1969, he executed his right hand man, Lt-Col. Banza, accusing the man who helped him in his own coup of plotting to overthrow his Government.

In Pan-African affairs his achievements have promoted the person of the President far more than it has advanced State policies. Bokassa has received decorations, of which he is vulgarly fond, from heads of State with whom he has courted personal friendly relations without apparently advancing the cause of state-to-state cooperation radically. On the contrary, he took his country out of the Central African Economic and Customs Union (UDEAC)—formed with Chad, Cameroun, Congo and Gabon—to join the Union of Central African States (EUAC), only to take CAR out of EUAC,

complaining that relations with Zaire, the dominant state in EUAC, was like that of "horse and rider".

Two weeks before he set out to inflict violence personally on the 50 hapless convicted thieves, Bokassa had decreed that captured thieves would be mutilated. First offenders would have one ear cut off; second offenders, the other ear; and third offenders the right hand. A thief convicted for the fourth time would be executed publicly by firing squad. These brutal sentences did not go far enough apparently and hence the decision to undertake State thuggery. According to eye-witness reports, the President himself led the beatings, telling his soldiers to continue clubbing the prisoners until exhausted. Three men died; their bodies were exhibited side by side with survivors whose wounds accused vagrants awaiting trial were asked to touch. There has been no public demonstration of outrage against the President's action. Instead, there have been more beatings. Bokassa has effective